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FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION IN A 





We analyze the long-run and short-run implications of financial liberalization in a small open 
economy. Our main results are as follows. First, whether financial deregulation in one sector 
can improve production efficiency may depend on financial regulation in other sectors. 
Second, financial liberalization may have opposite welfare implications to domestic agents 
with different productivity in the long run. Third, although some domestic agents lose in the 
long run, they benefit from financial liberalization during the transitional process of 
deregulation. Finally, a gradual implementation helps achieve a smooth transition. 
JEL Code: E32, E44, F34, F41. 
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According to neoclassical models, ﬁnancial liberalization has signiﬁcant economic beneﬁts.
International capital ﬂows provide developing economies with the means to exploit promis-
ing investment opportunities; at the same time, international investors are able to earn
higher returns and to reduce risk via international portfolio diversiﬁcation (Stulz, 2005).
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, 2003) investigate the dynamic interactions between
domestic and international collateral constraints and show that limited ﬁnancial devel-
opment reduces the incentives for foreign lenders to enter emerging markets. Iacoviello
and Minetti (forthcoming) assume that foreign lenders diﬀer from domestic lenders in
their ability to recover value from borrowers’ assets and, therefore, to protect themselves
against contractual non-enforceability. They show that such a model helps explain the
comovement of output across countries. Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2005) analyze the
medium-run adjustment process after capital account liberalization and show that pro-
duction eﬃciency depends on the degree of capital account liberalization. Alessandria and
Qian (2005) examine the impact of foreign borrowing on both welfare and the structure
of lending contracts. The entry of foreign investors to the domestic ﬁnancial market may
improve or worsen the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial intermediaries, leading to an improvement or
worsening of the aggregate composition of investment projects.
During the past two decades, many countries have deregulated ﬁnancial markets and
reduced explicit barriers to foreign investors. As a result, global capital ﬂows have achieved
record highs relative to global income. However, ﬁnancial liberalization might have un-
equal welfare implications to diﬀerent domestic agents. Furthermore, the policy sequenc-
ing and implementation strategy are of great importance for the success of ﬁnancial lib-
eralization. Recent experience with ﬁnancial crises clearly suggests that mistakes in the
policy implementation can contribute to severe macroeconomic consequences, e.g., sudden
stops (WorldBank, 2005).
We address three related questions concerning ﬁnancial liberalization in a small open
economy, given that the foreign interest rate is smaller than the domestic interest rate.
Does ﬁnancial liberalization and the resulting capital inﬂow improve production eﬃciency
in the domestic economy? Who beneﬁts from ﬁnancial liberalization in the long run and
in the short run? Should ﬁnancial liberalization be implemented gradually or hastily?
As ﬁnancial liberalization is a multi-dimensional issue, its various components may
have sophisticated interactions, which complicate the policy evaluation. Our main results
are as follows. First, whether ﬁnancial deregulation in one sector can improve production
2eﬃciency may depend on ﬁnancial regulation in other sectors. Second, ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion may have opposite welfare implications to domestic agents with diﬀerent productivity
in the long run. It helps explain the fact that ﬁnancial liberalization receives support and
opposition from diﬀerent domestic interest groups. Third, although some domestic agents
lose in the long run, they actually beneﬁt from ﬁnancial liberalization in the short run,
i.e., during the transitional process of deregulation. Finally, a gradual implementation
helps achieve a smooth transition of ﬁnancial liberalization.
Our results can be shown intuitively as follows. In a small open economy with the
inﬁnite time horizon, there are two types of domestic private agents: households and en-
trepreneurs. They have production projects using a durable physical asset, e.g., land, as
input. The project that entrepreneurs choose in equilibrium is expected to be more pro-
ductive than the household project. As households are risk averse and the entrepreneurs’
projects are subject to idiosyncratic risk, mutual funds emerge as ﬁnancial intermediaries.
They collect deposits from households and lend to entrepreneurs. If entrepreneurs could
credibly pledge all of their project outcomes for external funds, land would be all allo-
cated to entrepreneurs. However, due to ﬁnancial frictions, land is not fully allocated to
entrepreneurs and some of the land stock is ineﬃciently allocated to households. Given
that land has a ﬁxed total supply, production eﬃciency in the domestic economy can be
measured by the fraction of the entrepreneurs’ land holding in the total land stock. There
are two types of domestic assets: a physical asset (land) and a ﬁnancial asset (household
deposit at the mutual funds).
A continuum of foreign lenders who are risk neutral supply funds at a constant interest
rate lower than the domestic interest rate. Due to limited enforcement problem, domestic
agents have to pledge their domestic assets for foreign funds. We assume, for simplicity,
that a domestic public ﬁnancial regulator has full power in determining the fraction of
domestic assets pledgable for foreign funds. Financial liberalization is modeled as the
process during which the public ﬁnancial regulator raises such fractions and thus, domestic
agents can borrow more abroad.
Our ﬁrst result says that whether deregulating land-backed foreign borrowing can
improve production eﬃciency depends on ﬁnancial regulation on deposit-back foreign
borrowing. Our second result says that due to the substitution of cheap foreign loans for
domestic loans, the domestic agents with low productivity (households) lose strictly while
the domestic agents with high productivity (entrepreneurs) may beneﬁt from ﬁnancial lib-
eralization in the long run. Consider ﬁrst the case of deregulating deposit-backed foreign
borrowing, keeping the regulation on land-backed foreign borrowing constant. Households
3are allowed to borrow abroad against a larger fraction of their deposits. According to the
no-arbitrage condition, the interest rate diﬀerential between domestic and foreign loans
becomes smaller. Although entrepreneurs cannot increase their land-backed foreign bor-
rowing much, they can acquire cheaper domestic loans and more land is allocated into
their projects in the long run. As the wealth and the welfare of entrepreneurs are pro-
portional to their land holding, they beneﬁt strictly. Deregulating deposit-backed foreign
borrowing leads to the substitution of cheap foreign funds for household net deposits. In
addition, the unfavorable land reallocation and the resulting decline in their sales revenues
have the negative eﬀect on household wealth. Households have to reduce consumption and
increase labor supply, i.e., households lose strictly in the long run. Therefore, deregulating
deposit-backed foreign borrowing improves production eﬃciency and has opposite long-
run welfare implications to households and entrepreneurs. These results do not depend
on the regulation on land-backed foreign borrowing.
Things become complicated in the case of deregulating land-backed foreign borrow-
ing. If deposit-backed foreign borrowing is highly regulated, there is a large interest rate
diﬀerential between domestic loans and foreign loans. Deregulating land-backed foreign
borrowing allows domestic agents to acquire more foreign funds against their land holding.
Although households can also borrow more abroad, the average cost of external funds of
entrepreneurs declines more than that of households and thus, more land is allocated to
the entrepreneurs’ projects. In this case, deregulating land-backed foreign borrowing has
similar eﬃciency and welfare implications as in the case of deregulating deposit-backed
foreign borrowing mentioned above.
If deposit-backed foreign borrowing is already highly deregulated, the domestic interest
rate is very close to the foreign rate. Deregulating land-backed foreign borrowing does
not reduce the average cost of entrepreneurs’ external funds very much, while the cost of
households’ external funds declines signiﬁcantly. As a result, more land is allocated into
the household projects and production becomes less eﬃcient. Due to the substitution of
foreign loans for domestic loans, household net deposits decline and so do their wealth
and welfare. At the same time, the decline in the entrepreneurs’ land stock corresponds to
the decline in their net wealth and their welfare. Thus, deregulating land-backed foreign
borrowing may not necessarily improve production eﬃciency and may have negative long-
run welfare implications to both households and entrepreneurs. Such results depend on
the regulation on deposit-backed foreign borrowing.
Our third result says that although households lose strictly in the long run, they
indeed beneﬁt in the short run. Intuitively, as some of household net deposits are even-
4tually crowded out by cheap foreign funds, households consume these funds during the
transitional process and their short-run welfare increases.
Our fourth result says that due to ﬁnancial frictions, the land price overshoots in the
short run and the resulting macroeconomic ﬂuctuation is large if ﬁnancial liberalization
is implemented hastily. Intuitively, the announcement of ﬁnancial deregulation induces
domestic agents to increase their land holding immediately, because they anticipate a
higher land price in the future. The rise in the land price improves entrepreneurial net
worth contemporaneously. If the public ﬁnancial regulator implements the deregulation
policy hastily, the inﬂow of cheap foreign funds into the domestic credit market increases
immediately and the domestic interest rate declines dramatically. The improvement in
entrepreneurial net worth and the decline in the domestic interest rate jointly amplify
the land investment of entrepreneurs. Thus, the land price overshoots in the sense that
its immediate response exceeds its new long-run level. While, in the case of a gradual
implementation, the inﬂow of cheap foreign funds does not increase so much immediately.
The excess investment demand of entrepreneurs pushes up the domestic interest rate. The
rise in the domestic interest rate indeed curbs the excess land investment of entrepreneurs.
Thus, the land price does not overshoot and the resulting macroeconomic ﬂuctuations are
smaller in the case of a gradual implementation than in the case of a hasty implementation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 discusses the long-run implications of ﬁnancial liberalization. Section 4 analyzes the
transitional dynamics of ﬁnancial liberalization. Section 5 summarizes the main ﬁndings.
2 The Model
Consider a small, open, real economy. There are three domestic goods: a durable asset
(land) with a ﬁxed total supply, K, an intermediate good, and a ﬁnal good. There are
two types of domestic private agents with inﬁnite numbers: households and entrepreneurs,
each of unit mass. There is a public ﬁnancial regulator and a continuum of foreign lenders.
Households are risk averse and inﬁnitely lived. In each period, they have a safe back-
yard project to produce intermediate goods using land as the only input; they are endowed
with one unit of labor that can be supplied to the production of ﬁnal goods. Entrepreneurs
are risk neutral and each has a constant probability of death. In each period, entrepreneurs
of mass (1−π) exit from the economy and new entrepreneurs of the same mass are born,
keeping the population size of entrepreneurs constant. The newcomers and the surviv-
5ing entrepreneurs supply their labor endowment to the production of ﬁnal goods.1 They
have two available projects for the production of intermediate goods using both land and
ﬁnal goods as inputs. Both projects are subject to idiosyncratic risk: projects have pos-
itive output in the case of success and there is no output in the case of failure. Each
entrepreneur can choose only one project and his project choice is unobservable to oth-
ers. It takes one period for domestic agents to complete their projects. Land does not
depreciate, while the input of ﬁnal goods fully depreciates during the project process. In-
termediate goods are country-speciﬁc and only used for the domestic production of ﬁnal
goods. Thus, there is no foreign trade in intermediate goods. Final goods can be either
consumed, or invested, or exported.
The project that entrepreneurs choose in equilibrium is more productive than the
household project. Mutual funds accept deposits from households and provide loans to
entrepreneurs. A deposit contract is a claim on the ﬁnancial position of the mutual funds.
Thus, there are two types of domestic assets: a physical asset (land) and a ﬁnancial
asset (deposit). The foreign lenders are risk neutral and supply funds inelastically at
a constant rate of r∗. The public ﬁnancial regulator determines the degree of ﬁnancial
openness, deﬁned in subsection 2.1.
The ﬁnal good is chosen as the numeraire. Land is traded at the price qt on the spot
market. Let vt, wt, and we
t denote the price of the intermediate good, the wage rates of
households and entrepreneurs, respectively. The domestic interest rate rt is the expected
rate of return on the mutual funds. For simplicity, we assume that the foreign interest
rate is always smaller than the domestic interest rate around the steady state, r∗ < rt.
2.1 Asset-Backed Foreign Borrowing
The mutual funds have the exclusive technology to perfectly verify the project outcomes
of domestic agents and to liquidate the land stock of failed projects of entrepreneurs at
no discount. As foreign lenders do not have such veriﬁcation technology. domestic agents
cannot credibly pledge their project output to foreign lenders. However, they can borrow
abroad against their domestic assets. Normally, foreign lenders are less familiar with the
domestic asset market and would incur larger costs in liquidating collateral assets in the
event of debtors’ default than domestic agents. Furthermore, the domestic legal system is
biased against foreign lenders. Either way, foreign borrowing has to be overcollateralized
in the following sense. In period t, each unit of land is expected to have the value of
1Each entrepreneur must put a positive amount of own funds in the project in order to acquire loans.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) adopt the same approach.
6Etqt+1 in period t + 1 and domestic agents can pledge only a fraction of the land value,
θk
tEtqt+1, to foreign lenders for
θk
t Etqt+1
r∗ units of ﬁnal goods, where θk
t ∈ (0,1]. (1−θk
t) can
be regarded as a premium that foreign lenders would have to pay to the domestic land
buyers when they liquidate the collateralized land.2 θk
t can be aﬀected by many factors,
e.g., the eﬃciency of the domestic legal system, the structure and maturity of domestic
market institutions, the tightness of ﬁnancial regulations, and etc. Thus, θk
t reﬂects the
degree of foreign lender protection and the eﬀective ﬁnancial openness.
Similarly, each unit of deposit in period t has an expected return of rt in period t + 1





r∗ units of ﬁnal goods, where θd
t ∈ (0,1]. Given that households collectively
own the mutual funds, the deposit-backed foreign borrowing essentially enables them to
pledge part of the value of the superior veriﬁcation and liquidation technology of the
mutual funds to foreign lenders.
2.1.1 Two Implementation Strategies of Financial Liberalization
In order to analyze the policy implications of ﬁnancial liberalization, we simply assume
that θ
j
t are perfectly controlled by the public ﬁnancial regulator and determined at the
beginning of each period, where j ∈ {d,k}. Financial liberalization may occur due to
international or domestic pressures. We focus here on its implications instead of why it
occurs. In comparison with monetary policy, ﬁnancial liberalization is not a day-to-day
business and for simplicity, we consider it as an unexpected one-time structural change.
Be speciﬁc, θ
j
t keeps constant and the domestic economy is in its steady state until the
public ﬁnancial regulator decides to change it once for all. For its long-run implications,
we investigate the steady state patterns of production eﬃciency and social welfare under
various degrees of ﬁnancial openness in section 3. For the short-run dynamics, we model
ﬁnancial liberalization as the process in which the public ﬁnancial regulator raises θj
either by the big-bang strategy or by the gradualism strategy. In the case of the big-
bang strategy, it raises θj permanently in period t and keep θj constant at the new level










t denotes the one-time policy change in period t. In the case of the gradualism
strategy, it announces a path for θj gradually reaching the new level over time. The
2This premium may vary along the business cycle and so does θk
t . See Iacoviello and Minetti (forth-
coming) for a detailed discussion.






















where ρ determines the speed of θj approaching to the new level. The one-time policy
change ε
j
t does not aﬀect θj in period t, but θj grows eventually to the new level. See
Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) for the modeling approach. Figure 1 shows the time path of
θj under the two strategies, given a 1% positive policy shock in period 0. A larger ρ in the
gradualism strategy implies that it takes longer for θj to reach the new level. In section
4, we set ρ = 0.9 and compare the short-run eﬀects of the two strategies.



















Figure 1: The Policy Paths of The Two Strategies
2.1.2 Financial Contracts between Entrepreneurs and Foreign Lenders
As shown in subsection 2.3, entrepreneurs diﬀer in their end-of-period wealth and are
indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Given r∗ < rt, entrepreneur i prefers to pledge his land stock ke
i,e
to foreign lenders for z
e,∗
i,t units of ﬁnal goods before he turns to the mutual funds for









Due to costly state veriﬁcation, the loan contract with a non-contingent repayment is
commonly taken in the literature (Gale and Hellwig, 1985). In our model, the information
problem that gives rise to the ﬁnancial frictions between the entrepreneur and the foreign
8lenders results partly from liquidation costs that are proportional to the ex post land
value. In this sense, it is more reasonable to consider the state-contingent repayment
than non-contingent repayment. Since the entrepreneur and the foreign lenders are risk
neutral, the optimal ﬁnancial contract should let them share unexpected changes in the
land price proportionally. In other words, it involves the split of capital gains (losses)
between the contracting parties. If the public ﬁnancial regulator does not change θj,
there will not be any capital gains (losses). Even if the public ﬁnancial regulator changes
θj, capital gains (losses) only occur at the date of announcement. Thus, the diﬀerence in
the repayment form does not change our results qualitatively.
In period t+1, the foreign lenders get θk
tqt+1ke
i,t units of ﬁnal goods as repayment and
the land has a net value of (1 − θk
t)qt+1ke
i,t to the entrepreneur. For foreign lenders, the











2.1.3 Financial Contracts between Households and Foreign Lenders
Given r∗ < rt, households prefer to borrow cheap foreign funds and deposit at the mutual
funds to take advantage of the interest rate diﬀerential. They borrow z
h,∗
t units of ﬁnal
goods abroad against their land stock kt and borrow z
d,∗
t units of ﬁnal goods abroad against













As households are risk averse and foreign lenders are risk neutral, the optimal ﬁnancial
contract should perfectly insure households against unexpected changes in the land price
and the deposit returns. Foreign lenders get qt+1kt − (1 − θk
t)Etqt+1kt as repayment
on the household land-backed foreign borrowing and the land has a safe net value of
(1 − θk
t)Etqt+1kt to households in period t + 1. For foreign lenders, the ex post rate of












Similarly, foreign lenders get ˜ rt+1dt −(1−θd
t)rtdt as repayment on the household deposit-
backed foreign borrowing and the deposits have a safe net value of (1−θd
t)rtdt for house-
holds in period t + 1, where ˜ rt is the ex post rate of return on mutual funds in period t.
9By deﬁnition, rt = Et˜ rt+1. For foreign lenders, the ex post rate of return on the household





























where β ∈ (0,1) denotes the time discount factor. ct and lt denote household consumption
and labor supply in period t, respectively.
Given that kt−1 units of land were invested in the household project in period t −
1, G(kt−1) units of intermediate goods are produced at the beginning of period t and
household sales revenues amount to vtG(kt−1).
Assumption 1. The household project is decreasing-return-to-scale, G0(k) > 0 and
G00(k) < 0.
Given that households borrowed z
h,∗
t−1 abroad against their land stock kt−1 in period
t − 1, the land stock has a safe net value of (1 − θk
t−1)Et−1qtkt−1 to households in period
t. Given that households deposited dt−1 at the mutual funds and borrowed z
d,∗
t−1 against
the expected deposit returns in period t − 1, the deposits have a safe net value of (1 −
θd
t−1)rt−1dt−1 to households in period t. The household wage income is wtlt. At the end of





abroad against their land and deposits, respectively.
According to equation (3), households can borrow
θk
t Etqt+1
r∗ units of ﬁnal goods abroad
against each unit of land invested in period t. The household unit down payment is deﬁned
as the amount of own funds they pay for a unit of land, ut = qt −
θk
t Etqt+1
r∗ . According to
equation (4), households can borrow
θd
t rt
r∗ units of ﬁnal goods abroad against each unit of






















dt =(1 − θ
k
t−1)Et−1qtkt−1 + vtG(kt−1)




The optimization over {ct,lt,dt,kt} gives the equilibrium conditions,

































Each entrepreneur can choose one of the two projects: “Good” or “Bad”, at the end of
each period and his project choice is irreversible. Both projects have the same Leontief
technology, i.e., a units of ﬁnal goods are required for each unit of land invested.3 At
the beginning of the next period, the project produces R units of intermediate goods per
unit of land invested if it succeeds; there is no output if it fails. The two projects provide
the entrepreneur with safe, non-pecuniary private beneﬁts4 during the project process.
For convenience of aggregation, we assume that private beneﬁts are proportional to the
amount of land invested. Project “Good” (“Bad”) has a probability of success pG (pB)
and provides entrepreneurs with private beneﬁts bG (bB) per unit of land invested, where
0 < pB < pG < 1 and bB > bG > 0. In other words, project “Good” is safer than projects
“Bad”, but entrepreneurs get larger unit private beneﬁts from project “Bad”.
As shown below, entrepreneurs diﬀer in their end-of-period wealth and are indexed by













where ˜ T is the stochastic time of death and B ∈ {bG,bB} denotes private beneﬁts per
unit of land invested in project “Good” or project “Bad”. ce
i,t denotes his consumption
in period t and ke
i,t−1 denotes his land stock invested in period t − 1.
3In models with collateral constraints ` a la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the leverage ratio of borrowers,
deﬁned as the ratio of total investment over own funds, is equal to the inverse of the gross interest rate,
which is too high and cannot be justiﬁed by the empirical data. We introduce the input of ﬁnal goods to
reduce the leverage ratio of entrepreneurs to the reasonable level, e.g., two.
4Our set-up resembles the principal-agent setting in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998). According
to Hart (1995), private beneﬁts may refer to any nonpecuniary beneﬁts from running a project, e.g.,
large oﬃces or luxury business cars. Private beneﬁts are good for the project owners but may reduce the
success probability of projects. The trade-oﬀ between the success probability and private beneﬁts is a
short-cut to capture the divergent objectives between the project owners and the outside ﬁnanciers.
11Our calibration guarantees that only project “Good” has a positive expected net
present value around the steady state,
Et
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Therefore, project “Bad” should not be ﬁnanced in equilibrium. In addition, our calibra-
tion guarantees that the expected rate of return on project “Good” exceeds that of the























Thus, if the project choice of entrepreneurs were perfectly observable, entrepreneurs could
borrow against all outcomes of project “Good” and all land would be allocated to them.
At the end of period t, the entrepreneur invests ke
i,t units of land and ake
i,t units
of ﬁnal goods into either project “Good” or project “Bad”, using his own funds, ni,t,
foreign loans, z
e,∗
i,t , and domestic loans, zm





entrepreneur’s net worth in the project. The land-backed foreign borrowing contract has
been speciﬁed in subsection 2.1.2. As the mutual funds cannot observe the project choice
of the entrepreneur, the domestic loan contract resembles the standard loan contract
(Gale and Hellwig, 1985) and speciﬁes a promise to repay Rm
t ke
i,t units of ﬁnal goods
in period t + 1 if the project succeeds. As the mutual funds can perfectly verify the
project output, the entrepreneur always repays the promised amount if he is able to do
so. If the project fails, the entrepreneur hands over his land stock to mutual funds. After
repaying the amount owed by the entrepreneur to foreign lenders, mutual funds keep the
rest (1−θk
t)qt+1ke
i,t. In order to motivate the entrepreneur to choose project “Good”, the
mutual funds must provide him with enough incentives,

p




















The left (right) hand side denotes the expected utility of the entrepreneur if he chooses
project “Good” (“Bad”). As the expected rate of return on project “Good” exceeds the
domestic interest rate, the entrepreneur prefers to borrow to the limit. The incentive
constraints are binding around the steady state and can be simpliﬁed to,
R
m
t = Et[Rvt+1 + (1 − θ
k
t)qt+1] −˜ b, where ˜ b ≡
bB − bG
pG − pB > 0. (11)
Each unit of land invested in project “Good” in period t has an expected value of
Et(pGRvt+1 + qt+1) in period t + 1, in which θk
tEtqt+1 is pledged to foreign lenders ﬁrst.
12Any promise to repay more than Rm
t ke
t to the mutual funds in the case of success would
violate the incentive constraints and is not credible. Thus, the entrepreneur can only
pledge pGRm
t + (1 − pG)(1 − θk
t)Etqt+1 per unit of land invested to the mutual funds in
period t. Et(pGRvt+1+qt+1) and pG(Rm
t +θk
tEtqt+1)+(1−pG)Etqt+1 are the expected full
unit value and external unit value of the land invested in project “Good”, respectively.
The diﬀerence between the two values, pG˜ b, is used to motivate the entrepreneur to choose
project “Good” despite the lower private beneﬁts it promises, bG < bB.





i,t. It implies a credit constraint for the entrepreneur,
z
m












Γt is the domestic credit multiplier. As we are interested in the case where entrepreneurs
ﬁnance their projects using both own funds and external funds, our calibration guarantees
that the denominator in the deﬁnition of Γt is positive around the steady state; otherwise,
entrepreneurs can ﬁnance their projects using external funds only. As Γt is independent
of ni,t, domestic loans are proportional to the entrepreneur’s net worth.
Suppose that entrepreneurs ﬁnanced their project investment using foreign and do-
mestic loans in period t−1. At the beginning of period t, entrepreneurs of mass pG have
successful projects and entrepreneurs of mass (1 − pG) have failed projects. After the
project completion, entrepreneurs of mass π ∈ (0,1) receive a signal of survival and the
rest have to exit from the economy.
Entrepreneurs who have successful projects and receive the signal of death are of mass
pG(1−π). They repay their liabilities, sell oﬀ their assets, consume all proceeds, and exit
from the economy. Entrepreneurs who have failed projects and receive the signal of death
are of mass (1 − pG)(1 − π). They hand over their land stock to the mutual funds and
exit from the economy without consumption.
The newcomers and the surviving entrepreneurs are endowed with a unit of labor and
in equilibrium, they supply their labor endowment inelastically le
t = 1 to the production
of ﬁnal goods and their wage income is we
t. At the end of period t, the entrepreneur max-
imizes his expected utility function, subject to his foreign borrowing constraints speciﬁed
in equation (1), his period-budget constraints, and domestic credit constraints,
(qt + a)k
e










13where Ni,t denotes his end-of-period wealth. The newcomers and entrepreneurs who
have failed projects and survive to the next period are of mass (1 − π) + (1 − pG)π
and their end-of-period wealth is Ni,t = we
t; entrepreneurs who have successful projects
and survive to the next period are of mass pGπ and their end-of-period wealth is Ni,t =
we
t + [Rvt + (1 − θk
t−1)qt − Rm
t−1]ke
i,t−1. As the marginal rate of return on project “Good”
exceeds the foreign and domestic interest rates, entrepreneurs invest all wealth, borrow
to the limit, and postpone consumption to the period of death. It also justiﬁes the fact
that the newcomers and the surviving entrepreneurs supply all of their labor endowment.
Due to linear technologies and preferences, the foreign loans, domestic loans, and
project investment of entrepreneur i are proportional to his net worth. As a result, only
the ﬁrst moment of the distribution of entrepreneurial net worth matters for the aggregate
land stock in the entrepreneur sector. Let lower-case letters without the index i denote
per capita variables of entrepreneurs. Per capita consumption ce
t, net worth nt, domestic
loans zm
t , foreign borrowing, z
e,∗
t , and land holding ke
t of entrepreneurs are
c
e
t = (1 − π)p









































We introduce three auxiliary variables. The ﬁrst is the entrepreneur unit down pay-
ment, deﬁned as the amount of own funds the entrepreneur pays for a unit of land and











The second is the leverage ratio, deﬁned as the ratio of total investment over the en-






t . The third is the proﬁtability of project









t . The three auxiliary variables are independent of
the entrepreneurs’ net worth. Our calibration guarantees that the proﬁtability of project
“Good” exceeds the domestic interest rate around the steady state, ξt > rt. Thus, en-
trepreneurs supply all labor endowment, invest all own funds into their projects, borrow
to the limit, and postpone consumption to the period of death.
142.4 Mutual Funds
Let Ke
t−1 and Zt−1 denote the aggregate land stock and domestic borrowing of entrepreneurs
at the end of period t − 1, respectively. The aggregate expected break-even condition of




the beginning of period t, the total repayment of entrepreneurs with successful projects is
pGRm
t−1Ke
t−1; entrepreneurs with failed projects hand over their land stock (1 − pG)Ke
t−1
to the mutual funds. After repaying (1−pG)θk
t−1qtKe
t−1 to the foreign lenders, the mutual
funds keep the rest, (1 − pG)(1 − θk
t−1)qtKe
t−1.
The loan contract described in subsection 2.3 implicitly provides entrepreneurs with a
net unit return, with a positive expected value, pG˜ b > 0, in period t−1. For a successful
entrepreneur, the post-repayment return on a unit of land in period t is




t−1 = ˜ b + R(vt − Et−1vt) + (1 − θ
k
t−1)(qt − Et−1qt).
A policy change results in unexpected changes in the prices of land and intermediate
goods in period t, qt 6= Et−1qt and vt 6= Et−1vt . The expected net return to entrepreneurs,
pG˜ bKe
t−1, absorbs most aggregate risk and the ex post rate of return on mutual funds,
˜ rt =
[pGRm







(1 − pG)(1 − θk
t−1)(qt − Et−1qt)





diﬀers from its expected value rt−1 ≡ Et−1˜ rt due to unexpected changes in the price of
land. According to our calibration, 1 − pG = 0.01, the ex post rate of return on mutual
funds and deposits does not diﬀer much from its expected value. Furthermore, as the
foreign lenders also bear a fraction of capital gains or losses on the land stock of failed
entrepreneurs, the discrepancy between the ex post rate of return on deposits and its
expected value decreases in θk.
2.5 Final Goods Production and Balance of Payment










where Mt, Lt, and Le
t denote aggregate inputs of intermediate goods, household labor,
and entrepreneur labor.5 The inputs are priced by their marginal products,
5As households and entrepreneurs are each of unit mass, the values of aggregate variables coincide
with their per capita values.
15vtMt = αYt, (19)








































Assumption 2. lims→∞ Et(βsqt+s) = 0.
Assumption 2 helps rule out explosive bubbles in the land price and the economy
converges to its steady state along a locally unique equilibrium path after hit by a small
policy shock. Without explosive bubbles in the land price, the foreign borrowing backed
by land is sustainable and the economy does not run into the problem of Ponzi games.
2.6 Market Equilibrium
The markets of intermediate goods, ﬁnal goods, land, labor, and domestic loans clear,








t + NXt, (25)







t = 1, (27)
Lt = lt, (28)
z
m
t = dt. (29)











t}, along with aggregate variables {Mt,Yt,NXt,Z∗
t }








t } satisfying equations (2)- (6), (8)-
(27), given the exogenous processes {θk
t,θd
t}.
If land-backed foreign borrowing is not allowed, the market equilibrium is almost same
as deﬁned above by setting θk = 0. The only exception is that households have to bear
unexpected changes in the land price and their budget constraint are







dt = qtkt−1 + vtG
0(kt−1) + (1 − θ
d
t−1)rt−1dt−1 + wtlt. (30)
16If deposit-backed foreign borrowing is not allowed, the market equilibrium is almost same
as deﬁned above by setting θd = 0. The only exception is that households have to bear
unexpected changes in the deposit return and their budget constraints are
utkt + ct + dt = (1 − θt−1)Et−1qtkt−1 + vtG
0(kt−1) + ˜ rtdt−1 + wtlt. (31)
2.7 Calibration
As our paper intends to provide a conceptual framework to think about the implications
of ﬁnancial liberalization in a small open economy, we focus here more on its qualitative
eﬀects instead of its quantitative relevance. As an analytical solution is not obtainable, we
use a numerical example to show the intuition explicitly. We calibrate the model to fulﬁll
certain steady-state conditions in the case of international ﬁnancial autarky (θk = θd = 0).
















λ, is decreasing in the household land
holding, where λ = 8. We set β = 0.98 and ¯ r∗ = 1.01 so that the annual domestic and
foreign interest rates are 8% and 4% in the steady state, respectively. Households have
log utility in consumption, σ = 1, as used in Kiyotaki and Moore (2005). Since we want
to emphasize the eﬃciency gains due to the land reallocation between households and
entrepreneurs, we keep household labor supply relatively inelastic, ψ = −5, so as to limit
the eﬀect of household labor on aggregate output of ﬁnal goods. We set χ = 0.39 so
that households work eight hours a day in the production of ﬁnal goods, l = 1
3. We set
α = 0.36 and α0 = 0.00001 so that the household wage income accounts for nearly 64%
of aggregate output of ﬁnal goods and the entrepreneur wage income is negligible.
The aggregate land stock is normalized at unity, K = 1. The surviving probability of
entrepreneurs is set at π = 2
3, implying that one-third of entrepreneurs have to exit from
the economy each period. {R = 655,˜ b = 1.92, = 60,a = 1.53} are calibrated jointly to
satisfy the following conditions in the steady state: the land price is q = 1; the land stock
of entrepreneurs is three times as much as that of households, ke
K = 0.75; the leverage
ratio, Ω = 2, implies that entrepreneurs ﬁnance half of the their project investments
using own funds, as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
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3.1 Deregulating Deposit-Backed Foreign Borrowing
Figure 2 shows the steady state values of some variables in the model economy against
θd, given θk ∈ {0,0.5,1}, respectively. The horizontal axis denotes θd ∈ [0,1]. Agg, FG,




























































Figure 2: Deregulating Deposit-Backed Foreign Borrowing
Consider the case in which land-backed foreign borrowing is not allowed, θk = 0. See
the dotted line. Entrepreneurs can only borrow from the mutual funds and their external
funds, zm = d, consist of household net deposits, d−zd,∗ = (1− θdr
r∗ )d, and deposit-backed
foreign funds, zd,∗ = θdr






β, independent of θd. The rise in θd actually enables households to
substitute cheap foreign funds for their net deposits. In the case of θd = 1, households
fully pledge their deposits to the foreign lenders and domestic loans to entrepreneurs are
18essentially provided by the foreign lenders only.
As θd rises from 0 to 1, the domestic interest rate, r = 1
β+θd(
1
r∗ −β), declines from 1
β
to r∗. Intuitively, the increase in the inﬂow of cheap foreign funds reduces the average
cost of loanable funds in the domestic economy. Given θk = 0, entrepreneurs cannot
borrow directly abroad. However, the decline in the domestic interest rate due to the
rise in θd enables entrepreneurs to increase their domestic borrowing and expand their
project investment. In this sense, households act as ﬁnancial intermediaries to channel
cheap foreign funds into the domestic economy. Given the ﬁxed aggregate land stock,
the rise in the entrepreneurs’ demand pushes up the land price. Thus, the entrepreneurs’
leverage ratio rises and so does their land holding. As project “Good” is more productive
than the household project, aggregate output of intermediate goods rises. In this sense,
deregulating deposit-backed foreign borrowing improves production eﬃciency.
The rise in θd has three negative eﬀects on household wealth: the return on household
net deposit (1−θd)rd declines in θd and so do their land stock and sales revenues of inter-
mediate goods. According to equation (30), the negative wealth eﬀects induce households
to increase their labor and reduce consumption. Thus, households lose strictly from dereg-
ulating deposit-backed foreign borrowing. While, the entrepreneurs’ consumption, which
is proportional to their land holding, increases in θd. Thus, entrepreneurs beneﬁt strictly
from deregulating deposit-backed foreign borrowing. Similar patterns can be found in the
cases of θk = 0.5 and θk = 1.
3.2 Deregulating Land-Backed Foreign Borrowing
Figure 2 shows the steady state values of some endogenous variables in the model economy
against θk, given θd ∈ {0,0.5,1}, respectively. The horizontal axis denotes θk ∈ [0,1].
Consider ﬁrst the case in which deposit-backed foreign borrowing is not allowed, θd =
0. See the dotted line. The domestic interest rate is above the foreign interest rate,
r = 1
β > r∗. The rise in θk from 0 to 1 enables domestic agents to borrow more abroad
against their land stock. Thus, their demand for land rises and so does the land price.
As a larger share of entrepreneurs’ external funds is provided directly by the foreign
lenders at a rate lower than the domestic rate, the average cost of entrepreneurs’ external
funds declines signiﬁcantly in θk. As a result, the land holding of entrepreneurs rises and
so does aggregate output of intermediate goods. In this case, deregulating land-backed
foreign borrowing improves production eﬃciency and has opposite welfare implications to
households and entrepreneurs, as discussed in subsection 3.1



























































Figure 3: Deregulating Land-Backed Foreign Borrowing
lenders, θd = 1. See the dash-dot line. The domestic interest rate is equal to the foreign
rate, r = r∗ and households actually make zero net deposits. In the case of θk = 0,
although entrepreneurs cannot borrow directly abroad, all of their domestic loans are
essentially provided by the foreign lenders via the household deposit-backed borrowing.
As θk rises from 0 to 1, the cost of entrepreneurs’ external funds is constant at r∗, while
households can acquire cheap foreign funds against their land holding. The rise in the
household demand for land pushes up the land price and entrepreneurs have to reduce
their land stock. In this case, production becomes less eﬃcient.
The net value of the household land stock (1 − θk)qk declines in θk. Due to the
negative wealth eﬀect, households have to increase labor and reduce consumption. The
unfavorable land reallocation has negative welfare eﬀects on entrepreneurs, too. Therefore,
both households and entrepreneurs lose strictly in the long run.
In sum, as ﬁnancial liberalization is a two-dimensional issue in our model, the so-
20phisticated interaction between its two components, i.e., land-backed and deposit-backed
foreign borrowing, complicates its implications to production eﬃciency and social wel-
fare. Although deregulating land-backed foreign borrowing reduces the average cost of
external funds of entrepreneurs, it also reduces the household unit down payment of land.
Whether deregulating land-backed foreign borrowing can improve production eﬃciency
actually depends on the relative changes in the cost of external funds of entrepreneurs
and households. If deposit-backed foreign borrowing is highly regulated, the domestic
interest rate is still quite high. As θk rises from 0 to 1, the average cost of entrepreneurs’
external funds declines in a larger magnitude than the cost of household external funds.
However, if deposit-backed foreign borrowing is highly deregulated, the domestic interest
rate is already very low. As θk rises from 0 to 1, the average cost of entrepreneurs’ ex-
ternal funds declines in a smaller magnitude than the cost of household external funds.
In contrast, deregulating deposit-backed foreign borrowing has the negative eﬀect on the
domestic interest rate, which facilitates the land reallocation towards the more productive
agents (entrepreneurs). Thus, if the public ﬁnancial regulator has the objective to im-
prove production eﬃciency in the domestic economy, it should deregulate deposit-backed
foreign borrowing rather than land-backed foreign borrowing.
4 The Implementation of Financial Liberalization
This section discusses how the big-bang strategy and the gradualism strategy can result in
macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. Subsection 4.1 compares the dynamics of the model economy
to the two strategies of raising θd permanently from 50% to 55%, given that the economy
is at its old steady state θd = 50% before period 0 and land-backed foreign borrowing
is not allowed θk = 0. Subsection 4.2 compares the dynamics of the model economy
to the two strategies of raising θk from 50% to 55%, given that the economy is at its
old steady state θk = 50% before period 0 and deposit-backed foreign borrowing is not
allowed θd = 0. Endogenous variables are approximated as the linear functions of the state
variables in logarithms around the old steady state, which we solve using the MATLAB
codes provided by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004).6
6Section 3 shows that a permanent change in θj changes the steady state of the economy. Thus, the
dynamic analysis based on the log-linearization at the old steady state could be inaccurate. However, for
a small change in θj, e.g, 10% here, we can still use ﬁrst-order approximations to analyze the transitional
dynamics from the old steady state to the new steady state.
214.1 Deregulating Deposit-Backed Foreign Borrowing
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses of the model economy to the big-bang strategy
(dashed line) and the gradualism strategy (solid line) of raising θd permanently from 50%
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Figure 4: Deregulating Deposit-Backed Foreign Borrowing: Big-Bang vs. Gradualism
Consider the big-bang strategy ﬁrst. The public ﬁnancial regulator raises θd from
50% to 55% permanently from period 0 on. Households can immediately borrow abroad
against a larger fraction of their deposits and thus, deposit-backed foreign borrowing rises
dramatically in period 0. The supply eﬀect dominates in the domestic credit market
in the sense that the domestic interest rate declines contemporaneously. In the mean-
time, anticipating a higher land price in the new steady state, domestic agents increase
their land demand. Thus, the land price rises in period 0 and the capital gains improve
entrepreneurial net worth and household wealth.
The rise in entrepreneurial net worth and the decline in the domestic interest rate
22jointly amplify the entrepreneurs’ demand for land and the land price rises to clear the
market. The two-way reinforcing interactions between prices and quantities are the in-
herent feature of models with ﬁnancial frictions. The land price overshoots in the sense
that it rises by 1.6% in period 0, much larger than the 0.4% in the new steady state.
This phenomenon is similar as the exchange rate overshooting (Dornbusch, 1976). The
overshooting of the land price here results from ﬁnancial frictions instead of price rigidity.
The positive wealth eﬀect and the decline in the domestic interest rate induces house-
holds to increase consumption and reduce net deposits at the mutual funds in period 0.
Anticipating a lower consumption in the new steady state, households prefer to smooth
consumption by reducing their net deposits only by 8.5%, smaller than the 9.7% in the
new steady state. As deposit-backed foreign borrowing rises to its new steady state value,
aggregate deposits at the mutual funds rise by 0.98%, larger than the 0.38% in the new
steady state. Thus, the excess supply of domestic loans reduces the domestic interest rate
by 0.63%, larger than the 0.05% in the new steady state. The positive wealth eﬀect also
induces households to reduce labor and aggregate output of ﬁnal goods declines in period
0. As θd is constant at its new steady state value from period 0 on, the land price and
the domestic interest rate converge fast to their respective new steady state values and
so do household consumption and labor supply.
As shown in ﬁgure 2, households strictly lose from deregulating deposit-backed for-
eign borrowing in the long run. Since the domestic interest rate are lower in the new
steady state than in the old one, households consume their extra net deposits and their
period utility actually rises in period 0. In this sense, the overall implications of dereg-
ulating deposit-backed foreign borrowing to household welfare should be evaluated with
the consideration of both short-run and long-run eﬀects.
Consider now the gradualism strategy. The public ﬁnancial regulator announces the
future policy path of θd
t in period 0. See ﬁgure 1. Anticipating a higher land price
in the future, domestic agents increase their demand for land in period 0. Thus, the
land price rises in period 0 and the capital gains improve the household wealth and
entrepreneurial net worth. As θd
0 = 50% is still at its old steady state value in period 0,
deposit-backed foreign borrowing does not increase dramatically in period 0. Therefore,
the demand eﬀect dominates in the domestic credit market in the sense that the rise in the
entrepreneurs’ demand for domestic loans pushes up the domestic interest rate. Although
capital gains improve entrepreneurial net worth, the rise in the domestic interest rate
curbs the entrepreneurs’ demand for domestic loans and land. As a result, the land price
rises by 0.28% in period 0, smaller than the 0.4% in the new steady state. In other words,
23the land price does not overshoot in period 0.
The rise in the domestic interest rate and capital gains have opposite eﬀects on house-
holds’ decision on consumption and deposit. In equilibrium, households do not change
consumption and deposits much in period 0. Due to the consumption-leisure substitution,
households do not change their labor supply much in period 0, either. Thus, aggregate
output of ﬁnal goods does not decline as much as in the case of the big-bang strategy.
From period 1 on, θd rises gradually to the new steady state value. Due to the increase
in deposit-backed foreign borrowing, the domestic interest rate is below the old steady
state value in period 1 and converges to the new steady state value from then on. Thus,
household consumption rises above the old steady state value in period 1 and converges
to the new steady state value that is lower than the old one. In the meantime, household
labor supply falls below the old steady state value in period 0 and converges to the new
steady state value that is above the old one. The opposite short-run and long-run welfare
implications to households are similar as in the case of the big-bang strategy.
The big-bang strategy and the gradualism strategy diﬀer in their eﬀects on the domes-
tic interest rate in period 0. The big-bang strategy allows the immediate increase in the
inﬂow of cheap foreign funds and the domestic interest rate declines. Given that capital
gains improve entrepreneurial net worth in period 0, the decline in the interest rate fur-
ther amplify the entrepreneurs’ demand for land and the land price overshoot in period 0.
In contrast, the gradualism strategy does not allow an immediate increase in the inﬂow
of cheap foreign funds and the domestic interest rate rises to curb the entrepreneurs’ de-
mand for domestic loans and land. Thus, the land price does not overshoot. As a result,
output, labor, consumption, and net exports respond in a much smaller magnitude to the
gradualism strategy than to the big-bang strategy.
4.2 Deregulating Land-Backed Foreign Borrowing
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses of the model economy to the big-bang strategy
(dashed line) and the gradualism strategy (solid line) of raising θk permanently from 50%
to 55%, given θd = 0.
Consider the big-bang strategy ﬁrst. The public ﬁnancial regulator raises θk from 50%
to 55% from period 0 on and domestic agents can borrow abroad against a larger fraction
of the value of their land holding. Thus, the rise in land-backed foreign borrowing pushes
up the land demand in period 0 and the land price rises to clear the market. According
to the land-backed ﬁnancial contracts speciﬁed in subsection 2.1, entrepreneurs and the
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Figure 5: Deregulating Land-Backed Foreign Borrowing: Big-Bang vs. Gradualism
foreign lenders takes all capital gains on the household land stock and the land stock has
a safe net value to households. The capital gains improve entrepreneurial net worth and
entrepreneurs increase their demand for land over-proportionally. The land price rises
further and the spiral process between the land price, entrepreneurial net worth, and the
entrepreneurs’ demand for land continues. Altogether, the land price overshoots by 4.1%
and the entrepreneurs’ land stock rises by 0.65% in period 0.
Given that domestic agents ﬁnance their land investment using more foreign funds, the
entrepreneurs’ demand for domestic loans declines in period 0 and so does the domestic
interest rate. Thus, households prefer to consume more and deposit less. Anticipating
a lower consumption in the new steady state, households prefer to smooth consumption
by reducing deposits by 3.76%, smaller than the 4.57% in the new steady state. The
consumption-leisure substitution induces households to reduce labor supply in period 0
and aggregate output of ﬁnal goods declines.
The rise in the period-0 entrepreneurs’ land stock pushes up aggregate output of
25intermediate goods in period 1. Given that household labor supply is very close to its
new steady state value since period 1, aggregate output of ﬁnal goods exceeds its old steady
state value in period 1. Given no more policy shock from period 1 on, macroeconomic
aggregates converge to their respective steady state values. Thus, household period utility
exceeds its old steady state value in period 0 and converges to its new steady state value.
Consider now the gradualism strategy. The public ﬁnancial regulator announces the
future policy path for θk
t in period 0. Anticipating a higher land price in the future,
domestic agents increase their demand for land in period 0 and the land price rises to
clear the market. Capital gains improve entrepreneurial net worth and entrepreneurs
increase their demand for external funds and land. As θk
0 = 50%, entrepreneurs cannot
increase their land-backed foreign borrowing dramatically and they increase their demand
for domestic loans. Thus, the domestic interest rate rises in period 0. Households reduces
consumption and increase labor supply in order to deposit more at the mutual funds for
the favorable interest rate. The rise in household labor pushes up aggregate output of
ﬁnal goods in period 0.
As entrepreneurs can borrow abroad against an increasingly larger fraction of their
land value from period 1 on, the entrepreneurs’ demand for domestic loans declines and so
does the domestic interest rate. Anticipating a lower consumption in the new steady state,
households prefer to smooth consumption by further increasing their deposits despite a
lower domestic interest rate in period 1. The increase in the period-0 entrepreneurs’ land
stock results in the rise in aggregate output of intermediate goods in period 1. Thus,
aggregate output of ﬁnal goods is still above its steady state value in period 1 despite the
decline in household labor supply. From period 1 on, macroeconomic aggregates converge
to their respective new steady state values.
During the process of the rise in θk, entrepreneurs substitute land-backed foreign bor-
rowing for domestic loans and thus, households have to reduce their deposits eventually.
In other words, the rise in household period utility in the ﬁrst few periods actually results
from the spending of these deposits.
Similarly as in subsection 4.1, macroeconomic aggregates respond to the gradualism
strategy in a smaller magnitude than to the big-bang strategy in the case of deregulating
land-backed foreign borrowing.
265 Final Remarks
This paper provides a conceptual framework for analyzing the macroeconomic implica-
tions of ﬁnancial liberalization in a small, open, real economy. As ﬁnancial liberalization
is a multi-dimensional issue, the sophisticated interactions among its various components
complicate the evaluation of speciﬁc deregulation policy. Be speciﬁc, whether the deregu-
lation policy in one sector can improve production eﬃciency may depend on the ﬁnancial
regulations in other sectors. Furthermore, the improvement in production eﬃciency does
not necessarily imply a higher welfare for domestic agents. Due to the direct or indirect
substitution of foreign loans for domestic loans, domestic lenders strictly suﬀer from the
negative wealth eﬀect in the long run; while domestic borrowers might be able to acquire
more domestic productive assets and beneﬁt from ﬁnancial liberalization in the long run.
In this sense, ﬁnancial liberalization may have opposite long-run welfare implications to
domestic agents with diﬀerent productivity and aggregate output is not a good indicator
for social welfare in the model with heterogeneous agents. However, the welfare of domes-
tic lenders may rise during the transitional process because they consume the funds which
are substituted by foreign funds. Finally, due to ﬁnancial frictions, asset prices overshoot
and macroeconomic ﬂuctuations are large if ﬁnancial liberalization is implemented hastily.
In contrast, if ﬁnancial liberalization is implemented gradually, domestic agents have time
to adjust to the new policy and a smooth transition can be achieved.
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